Archive for February, 2008

CAC40 (in french)

Friday, February 29th, 2008

Le CAC 40 se paie aujourd’hui 10,7 fois les profits nets attendus par le consensus en 2008. Ce ratio est artificiellement bas en raison d’anticipations de résultats trop optimistes. Le vrai multiple de capitalisation tourne plutôt autour de 14 fois les résultats nets 2008, un niveau qui se situe dans la moyenne historique de valorisation du marché parisien. Traditionnellement, en période de retournement de cycle, les marchés touchent un premier point bas trois mois après l’entrée en récession et un deuxième au bout de six mois. Nous considérons que le CAC 40 a atteint son premier objectif de baisse en janvier et qu’il pourrait retourner dans la zone 4 500-4 300 points en mai ou juin. C’est à ce moment-là qu’il faudra redevenir acheteur du marché parisien. [Le Revenu]

S&P500

Friday, February 29th, 2008

Our recent view calls a gloomy market…

http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/sp-500.html

Bonds are performing on weak economic news. We maintain the view: the bottom still need to be resolved before all. Some technical triggers are getting more favorable in some corners: Health Care sub-index for example… Check the T-Bond 10Y index versus the SPX: Once we will face a break down of SMA50 for this ratio, it will be the proper time for a long and safe call on Stocks! But not now…

More on the Stock Code

Thursday, February 28th, 2008

After our recent post, http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/the-stock-code-last-month.html, we have received some demands of information about the Stock Code. In order  to give a hint of our method and decision process, we remind our readers some examples of our US analysis posted on December 2007 and debriefed on January 2008:

SILVER trading plan: http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/examination-silver.html

MICROSOFT trading plan: http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/examniation-msft.html

WALL-MART trading plan: http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/examniation-wmt.html

MATTEL trading plan: http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/examination-mat.html

GOOGLE trading plan: http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/examination-goog.html

HP trading plan: http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/examniation-hpq.html

More will come soon… Register just on the right to be part on our “email notification list”, it is completely free.

Forecasting Markets

Thursday, February 28th, 2008

Let’s start with some common false beliefs about any financial markets; it does not matter whether it concerns bonds, equities, earnings or any other financial product. Do we have to believe experts, as fund managers or financial institutes, when they provide forecasts with a great level of confidence? The conclusion of M.R. Geer (1999) is quite clear: “On the first business day of each year, the Wall Street Journal surveys the top macroeconomic forecasters in the in order to ascertain their predictions for the economy in the forthcoming year… The findings in this study thus indicate that the forecasts issued by the nation’s premier economic forecasters are no better than random walk or flipping a coin forecasts.” In fact, an enormous amount of evidence suggests that we simply can not forecast any financial market trend. For example, it is quite funny to know that around 75% of fund managers think that they are above the average at their jobs! It is an ancient lesson from Lao Tzu (6th century BC): “Those who have the knowledge don’t predict. Those who predict don’t have the knowledge”. Of course, on the very long run, as the economy is growing, it must reflect in earnings and then on main financial indices, but you have to keep in mind that it only holds for the very long run. In a report from the Federal reserve bank of Kansas City, Shen (2005) has concluded that “over the years, for investors who have held their portfolios for shorter periods (than 25 years), both stocks and bonds were exposed to substantial risks, and stocks does not necessarily outperform governments bonds.” Then, long term means at least 25 years. On shorter time scale, since a stock represents a ‘small piece’ of a company, the stock price should somehow reflect the overall value (net worth) of this company. However, the present value of a firm depends not only on the firm’s current situation but also on its future performance. Thus, one sees already the basic problem in pricing risky financial assets: we are trying to predict the future on the basis of present information. Thus, if any new information is revealed that might in one way or another affect the company’s future performance, then the stock price will vary accordingly. It should therefore be clear from this simple discussion that the future price of a stock will always be subjected to a large degree of uncertainty. We can not forecast but can we provide anything quantitative on a financial market? Financial markets are systems in which a large number of traders interact with one another and react to external information in order to determine the price for a given item, equity, currency, bond or any other products.

***

The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)

“I’d be bum in the street with a tin cup if the markets were efficient” (W. Buffet). In practice, all traders and external news result collectively into large fluctuations of any price of a financial product. It follows that any predictability pattern is neither detectable nor exploitable. This is basically what is called the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” (EMH) that Buffet contests: for him markets are not efficient, arbitrage opportunities exist and it’s possible to make money out of them! Of course, we have to consider any proposition by Buffet with the highest level of attention. Markets are complex systems that incorporate information about a given asset in the time series of its price. The EMH was originally formulated in 1965 by Samuelson. A market is said to be efficient if all the available information is instantly processed when it reaches the market and it is immediately reflected in a new value of prices of the assets traded. The conclusion of this ‘weak form’ of the efficient market hypothesis is then that price changes are unpredictable from the historical time series of those changes.

In 1970, E.Fama developed the first ideas on Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and made a distinction between three forms of EMH: (a) the weak form (of Samuelson), (b) the semi-strong form and (c) the strong form. The strong form suggests that securities prices reflect all available information, even private information. Seyhun (1986, 1998) provides sufficient evidence that insiders profit from trading on information not already incorporated into prices. Hence the strong form does not hold in a world with an uneven playing field. The semi-strong form of EMH asserts that security prices reflect all publicly available information. There are no undervalued or overvalued securities and thus, trading rules are incapable of producing superior returns. When new information is released, it is fully incorporated into the price rather speedily. Again, no arbitrage opportunity exists. What next? Certainly, the weak and semi-strong forms of the EMH are not fully correct and Buffet is right. Then, one can start from EMH and incorporate deviations from rational expectations in the behaviour of agents in an attempt to explain anomalies of financial markets. It raises the question of finding arbitrage opportunities! In addition, it is not so obvious that even if an arbitrage is present, we could exploit it. Since the 1960s, a great number of empirical investigations have been devoted to testing the limits of the EMH, which has been put on trial and subjected to a constant critical re-examination.

Books

Thursday, February 28th, 2008

http://www.amazon.fr/Concepts-Practice-Mathematical-Finance/dp/0521823552/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1204222752&sr=8-1

http://www.amazon.fr/C%2B%2B-Design-Patterns-Derivatives-Pricing/dp/0521721628/ref=pd_bbs_2?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1204222752&sr=8-2

http://www.amazon.fr/Black-Swan-Impact-Highly-Improbable/dp/1400063515/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1204222828&sr=8-1

http://www.amazon.fr/Fooled-Randomness-Hidden-Chance-Markets/dp/0812975219/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1204222828&sr=8-2

http://www.amazon.fr/My-Life-As-Quant-Reflections/dp/0471394203/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=english-books&qid=1204222858&sr=8-1

Web Sites

Thursday, February 28th, 2008

*** information

http://produitsdebourse.bnpparibas.com/fr/

http://www.la-chronique-agora.com/

http://www.agefi.com/

http://www.letemps.ch/finance.asp

*** quotes

http://www.boursorama.com

http://saxobank.com/

http://www.riskgrades.com/

http://dynamic.nasdaq.com/dynamic/afterhourma.stm

*** gold and co

http://www.kitco.com/

http://www.24hgold.com/defaultfr.aspx

http://www.belkhayate.ma/fr/bloomberg.php

*** Asia

 http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/CF/FR/MKJ

http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/en_us/ps/home.shtml

*** information us

http://www.cnbc.com/

http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates/

http://www.cboe.com/data/IntraDayVol.aspx 

*** quotes us

http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/

http://stockcharts.com/index.html/

http://stockcharts.com/school/doku.php?id=support:chartwatchers

 http://bespokeinvest.typepad.com/

http://bespokepremium.com/members/

*** discussions

http://seekingalpha.com/

 http://seekingalpha.com/author/bespoke-investment-group

http://seekingalpha.com/author/barry-ritholtz

http://seekingalpha.com/author/david-fry

http://seekingalpha.com/author/daniel-carroll

http://www.decisionpoint.com/

http://gicharts.blogspot.com/

http://www.prudenttrader.com/pt/

*** others

http://www.markettrak.com/index.html

http://www.forecasts.org/

http://frontlinethoughts.com/gateway.asp

http://frontlinethoughts.com/gateway.asp

https://citibankinternational.co.uk/france/FR/traders.asp?pageid=140

VINCI Euronext

Wednesday, February 27th, 2008

http://www.safetradingblog.com/stock-code-trading/vinci-euronext-in-french.html

Sell @ 47.1e (OPEN) => Gain +1.3%: I am not convinced by the opening and tensions are high on the market (see previous posts).

100% cash again.

Bond prices vs interest rates?

Wednesday, February 27th, 2008

Why do interest rates tend to have an inverse relationship with bond prices? 

At first glance, the inverse relationship between interest rates and bond prices seems somewhat illogical, but upon closer examination, it makes sense. An easy way to grasp why bond prices move opposite to interest rates is to consider zero-coupon bonds, which don’t paycoupons but derive their value from the difference between the purchase price and the par value paid at maturity.

For instance, if a zero-coupon bond is trading at $950 and has a par value of $1,000 (paid at maturity in one year), the bond’s rate of return at the present time is approximately 5.26% ((1000-950) / 950 = 5.26%).

For a person to pay $950 for this bond, he or she must be happy with receiving a 5.26% return. But his or her satisfaction with this return depends on what else is happening in the bond market. Bond investors, like all investors, typically try to get the best return possible. If current interest rates were to rise, giving newly issued bonds a yield of 10%, then the zero-coupon bond yielding 5.26% would not only be less attractive, it wouldn’t be in demand at all. Who wants a 5.26% yield when they can get 10%? To attract demand, the price of the pre-existing zero-coupon bond would have to decrease enough to match the same return yielded by prevailing interest rates. In this instance, the bond’s price would drop from $950 (which gives a 5.26% yield) to $909 (which gives a 10% yield).

Now that we have an idea of how a bond’s price moves in relation to interest-rate changes, it’s easy to see why a bond’s price would increase if prevailing interest rates were to drop. If rates dropped to 3%, our zero-coupon bond - with its yield of 5.26% - would suddenly look very attractive. More people would buy the bond, which would push the price up until the bond’s yield matched the prevailing 3% rate. In this instance, the price of the bond would increase to approximately $970. Given this increase in price, you can see why bond-holders (the investors selling their bonds) benefit from a decrease in prevailing interest rates.

***

BOND (definition):

A debt investment in which an investor loans money to an entity (corporate or governmental) that borrows the funds for a defined period of time at a fixed interest rate. Bonds are used by companies, municipalities, states and U.S. and foreign governments to finance a variety of projects and activities.

Bonds are commonly referred to as fixed-income securities and are one of the three main asset classes, along with stocks and cash equivalents.

The indebted entity (issuer) issues a bond that states the interest rate (coupon) that will be paid and when the loaned funds (bond principal) are to be returned (maturity date). Interest on bonds is usually paid every six months (semi-annually). The main categories of bonds are corporate bonds, municipal bonds, and U.S. Treasury bonds, notes and bills, which are collectively referred to as simply “Treasuries”.

Two features of a bond - credit quality and duration - are the principal determinants of a bond’s interest rate. Bond maturities range from a 90-day Treasury bill to a 30-year government bond. Corporate and municipals are typically in the three to 10-year range.

Japan & BOJ (in french)

Wednesday, February 27th, 2008

Parmi les 400 à 500 milliards de dollars de pertes estimées du fait des subprimes, les Américains et Européens en ont confessé et assumé à ce jour environ 140. Autrement dit, quelqu’un - ou quelques-uns - n’ont pas encore procédé à leur mea culpa et ce quelqu’un pourrait bien être les banques japonaises… En effet, les établissements bancaires sont sous pression légale car de nouvelles et strictes procédures comptables en vigueur les contraignent à une transparence accrue pour l’exercice se clôturant fin mars 2008.

Ainsi, la réplique du tremblement de terre américain dû aux subprimes pourrait bien venir du pays du soleil levant et d’Asie en général… en espérant que cette réplique ne soit pas aussi violente que la secousse initiale ! De fait, et comme il n’y a en général pas de fumée sans feu, les établissements bancaires japonais ont déjà considérablement resserré le robinet du crédit, ce qui ne présage rien de bon quand on sait que les taux d’intérêt nippon sont à… 0,5 % ! La fameuse théorie du “découplage” entre économie américaine et économies asiatiques a fait long feu car l’économie japonaise, qui est toujours - et de très loin - la seconde économie au monde doit aujourd’hui faire face à des périls aussi graves que l’économie américaine. Les commandes industrielles s’affaissent de manière inquiétante, la construction de nouvelles maisons atteint son niveau le plus bas depuis quarante ans et les prix de l’immobilier à Tokyo ont déjà perdu 22 % depuis cet été… Par ailleurs, signe avant-coureur de récession régionale, les exportations japonaises d’acier et de semi-conducteurs vers la Chine sont en net repli. Ainsi, ce grand marché asiatique supposé relativement immunisé à toute contamination occidentale et devant prendre le relais en cas de crise américaine se révèle tout compte fait étroitement dépendant de la bonne forme de l’économie américaine. Et comment espérer le contraire puisque les consommateurs américains achètent 30 % de leurs marchandises en Asie, exactement comme il y a dix ans ?

La Banque du Japon va donc devoir baisser ses taux d’intérêts même si, avec des taux aussi bas, il ne lui reste que fort peu de munitions. Elle devra donc boire le calice jusqu’à la lie et renouer avec la politique de “baisse quantitative” utilisée régulièrement jusqu’à un passé récent et consistant à approvisionner généreusement les banques avec des “hélicoptères ” chargés de liquidités. Il semblerait que l’espoir né il y a quelques mois selon lequel l’économie japonaise soit guérie de ses maux endémiques se soit rapidement évaporé et cela pose au monde un problème. En effet, ce pays est de très loin le premier créancier mondial car ses investissements à l’étranger se montent à 3 000 milliards de dollars, chiffre qui représente la totalité de la dette américaine ! les liquidités placées sur des bourses ayant décollé ces dix dernières années comme celle de Nouvelle-Zélande, du Brésil, d’Islande et surtout de Grande-Bretagne sont ainsi estimées à 1 000 milliards de dollars. L’opération classique de ces quinze dernières années ayant consisté en des emprunts libellés en yens car peu coûteux, convertis en d’autres devises et investis à l’étranger… Le Japon peut donc véritablement être considéré comme notre pompe à liquidités et c’est peu dire qu’une partie de notre bien être en dépend ! Il semblerait bien pourtant que cette pompe soit en train de s’inverser avec de forts rapatriements de capitaux en cours ayant pour effet direct une forte appréciation du yen.

Du fait de leur excédent commercial, les Japonais réalisent annuellement un bénéfice net de 250 milliards de dollars, mais les statistiques américaines démontrent néanmoins que leurs investissements en bons du Trésor américains sont restés stables. Il y donc de fortes présomptions que ces sommes aient été injectées dans le réseau américain des subprimes… A ce jour, les principales grandes banques japonaises n’ont reconnu que 4,7 milliards de pertes, mais Mitsubishi - la plus importante - a révisé 12 fois en hausse le montant de ses pertes depuis seulement le mois de novembre dernier ! Il semblerait bien que le monde de la finance nippon nous joue le “remake” des années 1990 où, de peur de perdre la face, il avait remis de multiples fois l’annonce de mauvaises nouvelles.

**************** 

Posible report de la nomination du gouverneur de la Banque du Japon (presse)
Date : 27/02/2008 @ 04h21
Source : TFN Francais
TOKYO (AFX) - Le gouvernement conservateur nippon pourrait
reporter à début mars la nomination du nouveau gouverneur de la Banque du Japon
(BoJ), en raison des sérieuses frictions politiques que cette question provoque,
a affirmé mercredi le quotidien économique Nikkei…

EURO/USD

Wednesday, February 27th, 2008

untitledeu1.gif

For the first time above 1.50!

We also have seen promising developments for the US yields as US treasuries sold off rather sharply yesterday compared to European counterparts. These are heightening the uncertainty once again on EURUSD direction as we remain stuck in the range (4 months and counting….). Hopefully, Bernanke’s testimony will get something started one way or the other. The action could even start today, especially if we get a rally ugly IFO reading out of Europe. We also have a slew of data from the US today.

We’re seeing a key test for EUR and the carry trade with EURJPY trying to determine whether it should maintain altitude above 160.00 after breaking that very important level yesterday (the 55-day MA is just below that level, 160.00 was a major support area before the big swoon toward 152 early this year, and daily Ichimoku cloud resistance also came in near this level yesterday) The important support for now 159.56 - the previous high.